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When Does Public Opinion Matter?
JENNIFER L. CHRISTIAN
Indiana University
Department of Sociology
The landmark 1996 reform to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) provides an opportunity to study processes of
welfare reform in the United States. A potential factor behind the
transformation of AFDC is public opinion, possibly in the form
of changes in attitudes among politically relevant groups. This
study will evaluate this thesis, focusing on attitudinal changes
between partisan identifiers. Most data suggest the American
public may have been critical of welfare programs prior to the
1996 reform. However, the extent of these criticisms generally
varies depending on who is asked, how questions are worded and
the type of program. Using General Social Survey (GSS) data, I
analyze trends in public opinion among political identifiers and
evaluate the process through which the 1996 reform was enacted.
Keywords: AFDC, partisan politics, policy change, public opin-
ion, welfare reform
One of the most sweeping changes to U.S. welfare policy in
recent decades was enacted in 1996; just four years after then
president Bill Clinton vowed to "end welfare as we know it."
The changes made to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) are particularly relevant to sociologists; most notably
because AFDC is the main form of family services and ben-
efits provided by the government in the United States and had
been one of the most important cornerstones in the American
welfare state since the 1930s. While much has been written
about the consequences of welfare reform, little attention has
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been given to the role public opinion and partisan preferences
may have played in bringing about these changes.
The passage of the 1996 reform was remarkable because
other attempts at legislation to reform the welfare system had
previously failed to pass through Congress or win support
of the President. The 1993 Health Security Bill exemplifies an
attempt at change that stalled in the face of opposition by con-
gressional officials and the public. Yet the 1996 Welfare Reform
legislation appeared to garner support from both major po-
litical parties (Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995). While each
party had different objectives in passing the legislation, they
seemed to agree that AFDC needed to change. On one side, the
Republicans pushed for changes in the way AFDC was imple-
mented, specifically contending that welfare should be admin-
istrated at the state level, while also attempting to minimize
out-of-wedlock births, which Republicans saw as the cause of
individual reliance on AFDC. Many Republicans also wanted
to see changes in the "incentive system" that was believed to
have been in place within AFDC (Weaver, Shapiro & Jacobs,
1995). Specifically, many Republicans advocated that work re-
quirements and caps be placed on the amount of funds that
each family could receive regardless of the number of children.
On the other side of the aisle, Democrats argued that more
should be done to promote childcare services and to provide
jobs to impoverished people. In the end, both Democrats and
Republicans agreed to change AFDC in such a way as to de-
crease overall benefits, add family caps, create limits on the
time in which individuals could receive assistance, and to im-
plement a work requirement policy.
It could be argued that the bipartisan efforts to overhaul
what previously had been an expanding welfare system, and
the drastic cuts that were implemented, should have been
met with some degree of public resistance (Pierson, 1996).
Indeed, public opinion data at the time suggested most citi-
zens favored the existence of many of the existing social provi-
sion programs (Cook & Barrett, 1992; Shapiro & Young, 1989;
Kluegel, 1987) and believed the government should help citi-
zens in time of need. Numerous public opinion polls have il-
lustrated that Americans support programs that provide basic
services to needy children and the elderly (Gilens, 1999; Page &
Shapiro, 1992). Gilens (1999) for example, finds strong support
When Does Public Opinion Matter? 135
for programs that target services for the elderly and provide
education services to children. Thus, when welfare programs
are called into question, elected officials may be required to
"pursue unpopular policies that must withstand the scrutiny of
both voters and well-entrenched networks of interest groups"
(Pierson, 1996, p. 144). This suggests elected officials must
balance their desire to implement program cuts against their
interest in preserving their jobs. As such, elected officials have
no choice but to consider how proposed changes to social pro-
vision programs might negatively affect their political careers.
Given bipartisan effort to change welfare and also the
seeming lack of political backlash, previous research and new
theorizing regarding public opinion may usefully be applied
to this instance of policy change. For example, previous schol-
arship suggests that the public should respond negatively to
the notion of cutting social provisions. However, if this is not
the case there may be some exceptions to when and how politi-
cal officials receive signals that indicate the public's approval
or disapproval regarding cutting social provision programs.
Here, I consider how partisanship and public opinion may
signal which programs are most vulnerable to change.
If reforms are proposed by political officials that would
likely result in Americans loosing benefits, it would seem
that they must be presented at a time when the public is most
likely to be amenable to change. Accordingly, it is important
to consider the temporal context in which policy reforms are
presented. In the case of the 1996 reform to AFDC, two histori-
cal markers likely paved the way for legislative change. (See
Weaver (2000) for a comprehensive analysis of the political
climate surrounding welfare legislation.) First, the passage of
the Family Support Act of 1988, which unlike the failed efforts
of the Nixon and Carter administrations, resulted in new legis-
lation that focused on moving welfare recipients into the work
force. Second was the Republican takeover of Congress in
1994, which provided the Congressional votes needed to enact
change. Buttressed alongside these historical markers were
changes in the political mood of Americans regarding welfare.
In other words, the President and Congress may have finally
decided to make significant changes to AFDC because of the
notable shifts in preferences among "median voters" (Downs,
1957). Moreover, the public's dissatisfaction with the status
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quo may have grown to such a level that elected officials felt
compelled to respond or at least be given the nod of approval
from the public to proceed.'
By taking a more nuanced approach and incorporating
theories about partisan preferences, we can more thoroughly
analyze the relationship between public opinion and social
policy. While over all shifts in public opinion tell us something
about democratic theory and government response, they alone
do not provide the depth of detail that an investigation of par-
tisan shifts would. It may be that growing animosity toward
welfare resulted in Democrats and Republicans converging in
favor of welfare reform. Yet it is also possible the Democratic
Party attempted to reach out to Republican voters by cutting
welfare. This would suggest that even amidst a growing di-
vergence in partisan support for welfare reform, the desire
to garner support from swing voters outweighed the po-
tential consequences of slashing welfare provisions. In this
paper, through analysis of General Social Survey (GSS) data
on Americans' attitudes toward social service provisions from
1973 to 2002, I evaluate different theories and hypotheses of
social policy change.
Theoretical Background
Generally speaking, Americans favor the idea of a
welfare state. However, it is commonly understood that most
Americans do not like the term "welfare." Previous research
has found that Americans' attitudes toward social services vary
depending upon which specific program is in question (Katz
& Thomas, 1998; Gilens, 1996; Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995;
Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Schram, 1992; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).
Americans are often willing to be supportive of programs that
provide assistance to the poor or that help the elderly, but at the
same time object to funding programs such as food stamps or
other forms of "welfare" (Gilens, 1999; Cook & Barrett, 1992).
These seeming inconsistencies in Americans' views regarding
different aspects of the welfare state have caused some schol-
ars to question the relevance of opinion data and the extent
to which public opinion matters in influencing social policy
(Burstein, 2006; Unnever & Cullen, 2005; Manza & Cook,
2002; Burstein, 1998; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Accordingly, any
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analysis of attitudes toward AFDC policy should not only
evaluate the public's attitude toward AFDC, but also include
an evaluation of other policies that comprise the American
welfare state. In doing so we are better able to evaluate the-
ories of public opinion and policy linkages, especially if the
compared policies are also on the Presidential agenda.
In addition to looking across different social provision
domains, it is necessary to consider the partisan aspects of
public opinion. Some scholars have argued that attitudes are
rooted in pre-existing political cleavages and individual value
systems (Feldman & Zaller, 1992). For example, some schol-
ars link specific policies with more general political ideologies
(Brooks, 2006; Bartels, 2000 [1996]), while Hochschild (1981)
argues that attitudes concerning welfare and welfare reform
are related specifically to Americans' beliefs about distributive
justice. Yet, how public opinion trends and attitudes towards
specific welfare state policies differ among individuals with
different political party affiliations over time has received little
attention. How partisan attitudes toward welfare changed
during the period leading up to and after the enactment of the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 merits further attention because it
can tell us how much support or opposition Republicans and
Democrats in Congress faced from their constituents regarding
welfare reform at different points in time.
In this paper I examine differences in Americans' attitudes
concerning social provision programs and changing partisan
identifiers. Because the primary focus is on the Welfare Reform
Act of 1996, particular attention is given to specific points in
time when shifts in public opinion on welfare favored the en-
actment of reform. More specifically, this research addresses
the following two questions: (1) Did public opinion trends
among Americans facilitate pressure to reform AFDC?; and (2)
Did attitudes among Republicans and Democrats converge or
diverge in favor of cutting welfare, as compared to other social
provision programs, in the years leading up to the Welfare
Reform Act of 1996?
Theories of Opinion-Policy Linkages
The relationship between public opinion and social policy
has been at the forefront of several debates in the fields of
138 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
sociology and political science. Some researchers have argued
that public policy shapes public opinion (McGraw, Best, &
Timpone, 1995). Others suggest that elites are capable of
shaping aggregate public opinion (Zaller, 1992), or capable of
manipulating preferences through their influence and media
attention (Domhoff, 1990). Still others have argued that public
opinion shapes the outcomes of government policies (Burstein,
1998; Brooks, 2003). Research suggests that there is a tempo-
ral order to the relationship between U.S. government poli-
cies and American public opinion (Page, 1994; Monroe, 1998;
Burstein, 1998), thus providing the foundation for new and
fruitful research on the linkages between public opinion and
social policy. Page (1994), for example, utilizes survey data to
identify aspects of public opinion that are particularly influen-
tial in shaping social policy. Like others, Page concludes that
public opinion does matter under certain circumstances, but
only with respect to some policies. For example, policies that
affect domestic issues are generally more susceptible to public
opinion than those relating to foreign affairs. Moreover, public
opinion may be more influential to policy formation when the
public is clear and vocal (Manza & Cook, 2003). This research
specifically speaks to the example of welfare policy, since it is
both a domestic issue and an issue and a policy arena on which
most Americans have a clear and vocal position.
Burstein (1998) suggests that public opinion affects policy
outcomes; however, the mechanism and conditions under
which public opinion directly influences policy may be con-
strained by several other factors. Specifically, Burstein reviewed
three different studies of public opinion and welfare policy and
determined that each found a significant relationship between
public opinion and the resulting government policy. Burstein
contends that the public, and specifically public opinion, should
be brought back into sociological research due to the potential
impact on governmental policies. Consequently, if scholars are
to understand why some social welfare programs are adopted
and others not, including why the Welfare Reform Act of 1996
became law, an analysis of public opinion is essential.
Variation in Social Welfare Programs
The welfare state is generally described as consisting of
different social provision programs, ranging from benefits for
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the sick and the elderly to family services and assistance to
the poor. Sometimes, these programs are referred to in general
as welfare expenditures. For example, welfare expenditures
include programs like Social Security, food stamps, unemploy-
ment insurance, and other cash or benefit allocation programs.
Each of these arenas of social provision tends to benefit dif-
ferent groups of people. It is not surprising to find variations
in public opinion based upon whether a question is directed
toward a specific program or toward an individual's belief
about welfare as a whole. Consequently, scholars have debated
how much or little support individuals have for welfare when
conceptualized as AFDC, as compared to other social provi-
sion programs. As an example, Cook and Barrett (1992) find
that in the early 1990s Americans supported the idea of the
welfare state, especially when the recipients are thought to be
deserving of the help. According to this line of research, we
should expect to see variation in support among all Americans
with respect to different kinds of social provision programs
and the targeted recipients.
Focusing specifically on AFDC, Weaver, Shapiro, and
Jacobs (1995) argue that Americans appear to be growing more
frustrated with the welfare system, and generally think of it as
ineffective. Citing, for example, a 1995 ABC-Washington Post
poll, 69 percent of Americans agreed with the statement, "[tihe
welfare system does more harm than good, because it encour-
ages the break up of the family and discourages the work
ethic" (Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995, p. 611). In addition
to causing more harm than good, many Americans thought
the existing welfare system fostered dependency (Frazer &
Gordon, 1994), was replete with fraudulent cases, and that re-
cipients were discouraged from participating in the workforce
(Weaver, Shapiro, & Jacobs, 1995).
In contrast to these perceptions of AFDC, Americans have
a distinctly different perspective of Social Security. An over-
whelming majority of Americans in the 1990s supported the
Social Security system and believe it is one of the most im-
portant government programs (Baggette, Shapiro, & Jacobs,
1995). Levels of support for Social Security have remained
relatively constant since the program's inception. Indeed, when
Social Security was presented as a policy in need of change, the
public appeared to react with outrage (Baggette, Shapiro, &
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Jacobs, 1995).
In sum, the literature on public opinion suggests several
noteworthy challenges. While previous research suggests
elected officials are likely to consider mass opinion when ad-
vocating for welfare policy reform (Burstein, 1998; Manza,
Cook & Page, 2002), we know little about those to whom the
elected officials listen. For example, is strong support among
only one party more likely to facilitate the adoption of a partic-
ular policy or is bipartisan effort the key to policy change? We
know little about how public opinion among Democratic and
Republican identifiers has changed over time with respect to
attitudes toward social provision programs, and particularly
with respect to welfare. Attitudes toward welfare are amply
important because the Clinton Administration may have rec-
ognized an opportunity to reach out to partisan groups and
voters that Clinton himself, and the Democrat Party wished to
attract, especially amidst a Republican takeover of Congress.
This scenario appears particularly relevant to the political
context of the early to mid 1990s, an era of strong partisan
divide and intense competition between the Democrat and the
Republican parties.
One of the distinguishing features of the Clinton
Administration was the degree that Democrats and
Republicans held very different views on the role of the gov-
ernment and social policy (Weaver, 2000). While Reagan was
able to attract some self-identified Democrats during his
presidency, Clinton's time in office was plagued by hostility,
scandal, and congressional shutdowns. Yet, it seems possible
that welfare was one issue that Clinton may have been able to
use to bridge the divide among partisan identifiers in order to
move forward with his overall policy agenda. This issue can
only be addressed through analyses of partisan identifiers and
their preferences toward various social provision programs.
Taken together, scholarship on public opinion and parti-
sanship offers a perspective that may help us better under-
stand how and why the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996 emerged and took the specific form
it did. Public opinion theories suggest that changes over time
in public support for social services may affect the likelihood
of welfare reform. Research on political behavior and partisan-
ship can be applied to the question of why welfare reform was
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passed during the Clinton administration as compared to the
Reagan administration. Furthermore, because of the expan-
sive time period of GSS data (1973-2002), whether there was
an overall downward trend in support for welfare spending
prior to the welfare reform of 1996 can be investigated. In
addition, an analysis of a convergence or divergence among
Democratic and Republican attitudes toward welfare over time
can help in understanding when constituents, the President,
and Congressional Democrats and Republicans were attuned
to enacting the reforms.
Data and Methods
The data come from the General Social Surveys 1973-2002
cumulative file collected by the National Opinion Research
Center.2 The sample was drawn from all non-institutionalized
English-speaking individuals over the age of 18 who resided
in the United States. Data was restricted to include only indi-
viduals with valid responses on the dependent and indepen-
dent variables of interest.' Depending on the dependent vari-
able, the original sample of 43,698 was cut roughly in half as
a result of the restrictions; however, there do not appear to be
significant differences between the original sample and the re-
stricted sample used in this analysis. The dependent variable
for welfare spending has a total sample of 25,348; spending on
race has a sample of 24,341; educational spending has a total
sample of 25,694; and spending on Social Security has 35,340
respondents.
The data allows examination of trends in public opinion
regarding welfare, race policy, education, and Social Security. I
hypothesize that attitudes towards welfare became increasing-
ly negative prior to the election of Bill Clinton in 1992. Also, I
expect that during the 1990s, overall support for welfare effort,
relative to all other policy domains, declined.
Dependent Variables
Four dependent variables are analyzed; welfare support is
respondent's attitudes towards welfare spending (too much,
about right, too little); support for blacks is the second measure
which is used as a comparison to welfare support allowing
a test of whether changes in support for welfare paralleled
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support for race policy, thereby suggesting a tightly connected
relationship between welfare support and attitudes toward
assistance to blacks; support for education is a measure of a
respondent's support for government spending on education;
finally, Social Security as measured by support for govern-
ment spending is included. Support for education and Social
Security are used to inform the analysis of overall shifts in
public support for government spending on social provision
programs. 4
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Construct De Mean
escription (Std. Dev.)
46
Age Respondents Age (1741)
Years of129Education Number of Years of Schooling Completed 12.96
Region Geographical Region of Residence0=South; 1=Non-south
Race Dummy for Race: 0- "'tire; I-Black
Gender Dummy for Gender: 0=Male; 1=Female; 0=Male
Employment Dummy for Employment: 0= Not in the Labor Force;
Status I- In the Labor Force
Year First Survey ear Current Survey Year (9.04)
Democrat Dummy for Democrat: I-Democrat; 0Republican; 0.400=Independent (0.49)
Dummy for Independent: 0.35
1 Independent; 0=Republican; 0=Democrat (0.48)
Democrat x Interaction for Dummy for Democrat and Survey 4,58
Survey Year' Year (7.93)
Independent x Interaction for Dummy for Independent and Survey 4.35
Survey Year' Year (8.07)
Note: N=23,577 (Entire Sample); N= 9,338 (Democrats); N= 8,193 (Independents);
N=6,046(Republicans)
*Republican x year is the reference category for both comparisons of Democrats and
Independents.
Independent Variables
The independent variables are shown in Table 1, along with
a description of the measure and how each is coded. Consistent
with previous research, controls for age, education, gender,
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race, region, and work status were included. Political party
is measured as Democrat, Independent, or Republican. These
categories were created by merging strong and weak identi-
fiers among both Democrats and Republicans into a single
Democrat or Republican category. To assess change in public
opinion over time, dummy variables for each year were created
along with a continuous measure of time. Interaction terms of
Democrat x year and Independent x year are included to allow
for comparison between partisan identifiers (Democrats and
Independents) compared to Republicans.
Method
Multinomial logistic regression is used to analyze changing
attitudes among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans
across each policy domain. The more common ordinary least
squares estimation was not used because it is inappropriate for
models with nominal outcomes (Long, 1997).
Results
Trends in Attitudes toward Government Spending
Attitudes towards spending differ depending on the
program. Figure 1 summarizes the percent of Americans who
believe the government is spending too much on each of the
four policy domains investigated. Attitudes toward welfare
have dramatically changed over time. There is a net decline
in the belief that the government is spending "too much,"
but also a sharp 20% upswing during the early 1990s in such
perceptions. In contrast, there has been far less variation in
the percentage of Americans who believe the government is
spending too much on assistance to blacks, education, and
Social Security. In each case, public support remains rather
steady over time.
A similar analysis was done for the "too little" category,-
which reveals that Americans are least likely to say that the
government is spending too little on welfare. While the per-
centage of Americans reporting these views changes over time,
welfare is always the least favorable expenditure out of all
social provision programs investigated. Second, Americans are
more likely to say that the government is spending too little on
education as compared to all other social provision programs.
In the 1970s, roughly 50 percent of Americans believed the
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Figure 1. General Trends Spending Preferences for the "Too Much"
Category
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government was spending too little on education. Today, that
number has grown to nearly 75 percent. Spending on Social
Security has also garnered significant levels of support. In 1984,
53 percent of Americans believed the government was spend-
ing too little on Social Security. While there was a slight dip in
support in the early 1990s, Americans' support rebounded to
over 60 percent in 2002.
Attitudes toward spending on welfare and blacks stand in
stark contrast to other forms of social service spending, having
never reached the same level of support of either education
or Social Security, even at points in time when support levels
for the latter two dipped. There are, however, some notable
differences between Americans' attitudes toward spending
on welfare and race policy. Spending on blacks garners more
support than spending on welfare and has changed only
slightly over time. For example, in 1973 support for increasing
assistance to blacks was roughly 35 percent, where it remains
today. Support for an increase in assistance to blacks did drop
to 25 percent in the early 1980s, but then steadily increased
as the 1980s progressed, and peaked at 45 percent in 1988. In
contrast, less than 30 percent of Americans believe the govern-
ment is spending too little on welfare. Like attitudes toward
assistance to blacks, support for welfare was the highest in the
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1980s; however, in both the late 1970s and 1990s support for
welfare spending dropped by nearly 10 percent.
Additional analyses show changes in the belief that the
government is spending about the "right amount" on social
provision programs. While variation can be found between
the different programs, overall support for the status quo has
remained mostly stable with respect to welfare, assistance to
blacks, and Social Security. With respect to welfare spending,
there has been a slight reduction in the percentage of Americans
who support keeping welfare spending at its current level. In
1991, 37 percent of Americans felt the government was spend-
ing about the right amount. However, by 1994 this had dropped
to 25 percent and this trend appears to have shifted again
since the passage and implementation of the Welfare Reform
Act of 1996, as evidenced by the 18 percent jump in public
opinion supporting an increase in spending between 1996 and
2000. When looking at spending on blacks, the data indicates
roughly 45 percent of Americans say the government is spend-
ing about the right amount. This level of support is similar to
that for spending on social welfare, where 40 to 45 percent of
Americans favor the current level of spending. Supporting
the status quo on education, however, has decreased from 40
percent at its peak in 1973, to roughly 20 percent in 2002.
In sum, the data on the percentage of Americans' spending
preferences illustrate several trends in American public opinion
over the past 30 years. Levels of support for each social provi-
sion program differ across the four policy domains. Unlike any
other policy domain, support for welfare spending fluctuates
significantly over time and is the least supported of all of the
social provision programs. Accordingly, welfare appears to
be the one social provision program that Americans are most
willing to support changing. Spending on assistance to blacks
is also less favorable than education and Social Security for
which most Americans indicate they would prefer for the gov-
ernment to increase spending. Support for spending on blacks
and welfare not only lack support from most Americans, but
in the case of welfare, support levels are quite volatile. To
get a more nuanced understanding of what factors are likely
to explain these trends and how they differ among partisan
groups, I now turn to the multivariate analyses.
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Explaining Support for Welfare Spending
Table 2 presents the coefficients for the statistical models
applied to each policy domain. The first column presents the
model for attitudes toward welfare spending, the second for
spending on blacks, the third spending on education, and the
last reports the coefficients for spending on Social Security.
Each of the spending variables has three response categories:
spending "too little"; "about right"; and "too much." There are
two sets of coefficients presented for each model, along with
standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients
(Standard Errors In Parentheses)
(1)
elfare ,
(3)
Education,
(4)
Social
Securi t
Independent Too About Too About Too About Too About
Variable Little Right Little Right Little Right Little Right
-.10* -.51" -.73* 22 2.84* 2.81* 3,62* 1.52'
Constant .13 .12 .14 _.13) (.20) (.20) (.20) (.20)
Sociodenographic Variables
Age (in years) -1.29' -.04 -1.28' -.501 -3.67' -2.60' .351 1.97
*100 (11) (.09) (12) (11) (.16) (17) (.19) (,19)
Education (in -.04* .01" .10* .06* .10" -.03* -.00" -.05*
ers) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Race
1.50" .61" 3.87* 1.70 3.88 .95' .56 -.04
Black (.05) (.05) (.14) (.15) (.14) (.14) (.10) (.11)
Gender
.19' .09* .35 .36* .50' .45 .67' .40'
Female (.04) (.03) (,04) (.04) (.05) '05) (.06) (06)
Reion
14' -.12 -.33* -.23 " .34' .15 -.07 -.13
South (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Work Status
- 50' -.37' -.23* -.111 -.14 " - 15' -15 -.31
Emploed 05 .04 (05) (.05) (.06) (0 (.08) 
(08)
Political P rtyl
.60* .13" .48* -.00 .36* .16 -.01 -.16
Democrat (.07) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.09) (.10) (.24) (.24)
.3 .01 .35 -.06 -.15" -.16 -.18 -.10
Independent .07 .06 .08 _.06} (.09) (.10) .20 .21
Interaction Effects
.01' .01 " .03' .01 " .04' .02* .04' .03'YearDemocrat (00) (.00) ('00) (.00) (.00) ('00) (.07) ('01)
Year* .02* .01" .01* .01 -.03* .02* .03* .01*
Idependent .00 .00 .00 .01) (.00) (.00) .01 .01
Source: General Social Survey
*p < .05, 1 N = 25,348; 1 N = 24,341; 1 N 25,694, d N = 25,340
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Effects of Sociodetnographic Characteristics on Social Spending
The effects of sociodemographic characteristics on policy at-
titudes are reported first. The effect of age on attitudes towards
government spending differs significantly across policy
domain. Older people are more likely than younger people to
say the government is spending too much on welfare, blacks,
and education. As might be expected, older people are also less
likely to say the government is spending too much on Social
Security as compared to too little or about the right amount.
The effect of gender on attitudes toward social spending
is consistent with previous research (Howell & Day, 2000).
Women have more liberal attitudes than men toward spending
on all policy domains. Overall, women are also more likely to
claim the government is spending too little or about the right
amount on all of the policy domains.
Blacks are considerably more favorable than non-blacks
toward spending on all policy domains. Additionally, there is
evidence of regional variation in support for social spending.
People living in the south are consistently more likely to agree
the government is spending too much as compared to too
little or about the right amount on welfare, blacks, and educa-
tion, but do not differ from residents of other regions in their
support for spending on Social Security.
Employed people, as compared to people who are unem-
ployed, retired, or in school, are more likely to agree the gov-
ernment is spending too much on welfare, blacks, education,
and Social Security and to say the government is spending too
much as compared to about the right amount of money on all
policies except Social Security.
While years of schooling are generally thought to have a
liberalizing effect, the results suggest this is not always the
case. Education level has a liberalizing effect with respect to
supporting spending on blacks, but in contrast, there is a con-
servative trend for spending on Social Security. Well-educat-
ed people are less likely to agree the government is spending
too little or about the right amount as compared to too much.
Education increases the likelihood a respondent will agree the
government is spending too much on welfare as compared to
too little. Furthermore, well-educated respondents are also
more likely to say the government is spending about the right
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amount as compared to too much on welfare policy. When
asked about spending on education, well-educated individu-
als are more likely to say the government is spending too little
as compared to too much. They are also less likely to say the
government is spending too much as compared to about the
right amount on education.
Effects of Political Party Affiliation on Social Spending Attitudes
Turning to the measures of partisanship, we see that
Democrats have consistently more liberal attitudes toward
government spending on welfare policy, assistance to blacks,
and education in comparison to Republicans. The greatest dif-
ference between partisan identifiers is on the issue of welfare
spending. The odds of choosing the too little option as com-
pared to selecting the too much option for welfare spending is
1.82 times greater for Democrats than for Republicans, holding
all other variables constant. In other words, Democrats are
nearly twice as likely to believe the government is spend-
ing too little on welfare. Regarding assistance to blacks, the
odds of selecting the too little spending option as compared to
the "too much" option is 1.62 greater for Democrats as com-
pared to Republicans, holding all other variables constant.
Again, Democrats are more likely to report that they believe
the government is spending too little on assistance to blacks.
Regarding spending on education, the odds of selecting the
too little option, as compared to too much is 1.43 times greater
for Democrats as compared to Republicans, holding all other
variables constant. However, there is no significant difference
in attitudes between Republican and Democratic identifiers re-
garding spending preferences toward Social Security.
Independents differ from Republicans with respect to
welfare and race policy, but only when comparing atti-
tudes toward spending too little as compared to too much.
There is no significant difference between Independents and
Republicans when spending preferences for the about right
option is compared to the too much option. In general, the
differences in policy attitudes between Independents' views
and Republicans' views are smaller in magnitude in compari-
son to the earlier differences found between Democrats and
Republicans.
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Changing Preferences among Partisan Identifiers
To assess changing attitudes among political party iden-
tifiers, the statistical model includes an interaction term for
Democrat x year, Republican x year, and also Independent
x year.6 The results show a statistically significant difference
between Democratic and Republican attitudes toward spend-
ing on welfare policy, race policy and education policy over
time. To elaborate on this finding, not only are there partisan
differences in social policy preferences, but also those differ-
ences have themselves changed over time.
Independents are consistently situated between Democrats
and Republicans in their attitudes toward spending preferenc-
es. As compared to Republicans, Independents are more likely
over time to favor increasing spending on welfare, race policy,
and Social Security, yet the same pattern does not hold true
for education. Over time, Independents favoring the too little
spending category has shifted in a conservative direction.
As for Democrats, the significant 0.01 coefficients for the
two response categories for the welfare item show a trend rela-
tive to Republicans. This suggests that over time Democrats
have become more supportive of both the too little and the
about right option as compared to the too much option. For
Independents, the 0.02 coefficient for the too little category and
the 0.01 coefficient for the about right category further suggests
increasing levels of support for welfare policy as compared to
Republicans.
Turning to assistance to blacks, the 0.03 interaction coef-
ficient shows Democrats have moved (relative to Republicans)
in a more liberal direction. The 0.01 coefficient for the status
quo category also shows a smaller, yet statistically significant
trend involving a preference for the about the right option as
compared to the too much option. Similarly, this pattern holds
true for Independents.
Regarding education, Democrats have again become no-
ticeably more favorable toward spending than Republicans
and Independents over time. As indicated by the 0.04 coeffi-
cient, there is a growing divergence between Democratic and
Republican beliefs that the government is spending too little
on education. Attitudes toward education spending are per-
plexing when we turn to the differences between Independents
150 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
and Republicans. More specifically, over time, the -0.03 coef-
ficient for the too little category suggests Independents have
become less supportive than Republicans are toward educa-
tion spending, and that they have also become more likely to
favor the status quo as indicated by the 0.02 coefficient for the
about right category than are Republicans.
Democrats and Independents have become more favor-
able toward Social Security spending over time. The 0.04 coef-
ficient for the too little category and the 0.03 coefficient for the
about right category indicate a growing difference in support
levels between Democrats and Republicans. Likewise, the cor-
responding coefficients for Independents, 0.03 for the too little
category and the 0.01 coefficient for the about right category
also indicate a persisting trend.
Trends in Policy Attitudes among Partisan Identifiers
An analysis of the predicted logits for partisan identifiers
was completed for each of the policy domains and compares
the estimated responses across the three levels of spending
preferences. 7 The novel extension of these analyses reveals a
rise in partisan divergence over time when comparing prefer-
ences for the "too little" option to the "too much" option toward
spending on assistance to blacks. From the 1970s through the
1980s support levels were on a downward trend, but in the
early 1980s support levels increased significantly. These differ-
ences continued to rise through the early 1990s at which point
support for assistance to blacks dropped and partisan diver-
gence increased.,
The results for education differ in two respects. First, the
data suggest a generally higher level of support for education
spending among all groups, but also reveal the largest partisan
divergence, so that larger partisan differences have become
amplified over time. Whereas initially, Independents and
Republicans were fairly similar in their education spending
preferences, a growing divergence between these two partisan
groups was clearly visible by the 1990s and has consistently
become magnified since that time.
The final part of the analyses describes partisan attitudes
toward Social Security spending. The analyses suggest there
are relatively small differences among partisan identifiers;
however, it should again be emphasized that overall support
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for increasing spending is high among all three partisan
groups.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has sought to address two key questions with
respect to the nature of the relationship between public opinion
and social policy. First, did support for welfare spending
sharply decline during the period leading up to the passage
of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, which may have indicated
the public was willing to support reform? Second, to further
the literature in this area, analyses have been included to test
whether attitudes among Republicans and Democrats in favor
of cutting welfare expenditures converged or diverged prior
to the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. The results presented here
advance our understanding of how changing support for social
provision programs may signal to public officials which poli-
cies are "fair game" for retrenchment.
Beginning with the first question of whether there was a
net decline in support for welfare as compared to other social
provision programs, I find a conservative shift in spending
preferences over time, and that the American public, across
partisan identifiers, was less supportive of welfare spend-
ing in comparison to other aspects of the U.S. welfare state.
Moreover, I find that welfare was the policy domain most
vulnerable to retrenchment efforts due to the overall lack of
support among most Americans regardless of party identifica-
tion. The timing in which these conservative trends became
most evident is crucial. The most notable shift in public opinion
toward welfare spending occurred during the early years of
the Clinton administration, and more specifically from 1991
to 1996. Thus, these trends may have signaled to government
representatives that AFDC was the least supported social pro-
vision program and the policy domain with falling levels of
support. These findings are not at odds with other scholarship
suggesting that shifts in public opinion may have coincided
with Clinton's anti-welfare campaign or even been somewhat
influenced by it (Schneider & Jacoby, 2005). Instead, this sug-
gests a more nuanced explanation for why more drastic cuts
to welfare were enacted under the Clinton administration as
compared to the Reagan administration. Absent from the equa-
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tion under the Reagan administration was an overarching neg-
ativity toward welfare spending among partisan identifiers.
Specifically, the data demonstrate that among all of the social
provision programs that were on the table for reform--edu-
cation, Social Security, assistance to blacks and welfare-the
one that eventually resulted in changing legislation, welfare,
required the Clinton administration to be very attuned to cen-
trist and Republican voters, and therefore, be more strategic in
listening to only certain dimensions of public opinion and only
on a specific issue.
While these findings suggest that public opinion matters,
the analyses also show how partisanship in conjunction with
public opinion may have contributed to what appeared to
be bipartisan support for welfare reform. A partisan divide
on welfare spending during the Clinton administration may
have created further impetus for welfare reform. In general,
Democrats, Independents, and Republicans have had quite
different attitudes toward government spending on all kinds
of social provision programs over the three decades from 1973
to 2002. The partisan divide is greatest with respect to welfare
and education spending and is not nearly as large with respect
to spending on assistance to blacks or Social Security. Simply
put, some policies are more politically divisive than others,
and in turn, some issues appear to have experienced strong
partisan divergence over time.
The focus on AFDC rather than education, Social Security,
or assistance to blacks, may have been a response to declin-
ing Republican support for welfare spending rather than shifts
in Democrats' attitudes toward this issue. Rather than cut all
social programs, Democratic politicians may have focused on
AFDC in order to appeal to Republican voters. The fact that
the Clinton Administration focused on a program that was as
politically divisive as AFDC suggests the Welfare Reform Act
of 1996 was likely an attempt to reach out and garner support
from Republican and swing voters rather than members of the
core Democrat constituency.
As a final note, this analysis allowed an investigation of
how partisan identifiers reacted after the welfare legislation
was passed and implemented and results on its effectiveness
were released to the general public. Interestingly, in the years
just after the implementation of AFDC reforms, there was a
When Does Public Opinion Matter? 153
dramatic shift in public support. In 2000, levels of support
for welfare had almost returned to the levels present during
both the Reagan era and early Clinton era when they were at
their 30-year peak. Possibly, the reforms passed were enough
to pacify most AFDC opponents. Or, alternatively, Americans
faced with inconclusive evidence of the effectiveness and im-
plications of the reforms were again indicating to political of-
ficials the need for more change, but in the opposite direction
of the 1996 reforms. Regardless, these trends may prove to be
fruitful grounds for future research.
In conclusion, public opinion likely provided the elector-
al background for Clinton to enact major reforms to welfare
policy without fearing political reprisal. Possibly because of
growing animosity toward welfare spending and AFDC in
particular, it is likely that Clinton knew he would not be faced
with much of a political backlash from either his constituents
or Republicans. Unlike any other social provision program
during the 1990s, this domain of the American welfare state
was the most vulnerable to substantial reforms and retrench-
ment effort.
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(Endnotes)
1) While scholarship on elite theories (Zaller, 1992) posit that elites,
such as the President, are capable of manipulating or influenc-
ing public opinion, in the case of welfare, a highly salient issue in
American politics, there is a history of scholarship supporting the
argument that the main causal effects go in the other direction and
that public opinion is likely a driving force for welfare reform (Page
& Shapiro 1983; Lowery; Gray & Hager, 1989; Burstein, 1991 [1998];
Manza, Cook & Page, 2002; Wlezien & Soroka in press).
2) While the focus of this study is on variation in public opinion
among partisan identifiers leading up to the passage of the 1996
Welfare Reform Act, current GSS data allow for additional descrip-
tive analyses regarding changes in support for welfare policy after
the implementation of the new AFDC regulations.
3) Ultimately, the 2002 data had to be excluded from the analyses
due to complications in coding the race variable. During this year
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the National Research Opinion Center allowed for respondents to
pick several different racial/ethnic identities, as such it would be dif-
ficult to make comparisons between White and Black respondents in
a consistent manner.
4) The specific wording of these variables can be found at the search-
able GSS codebook at the ICPSR located at http://www.icpsr.umich.
edu/GSS/
5) For the sake of brevity, not all figures related to these analyses are
presented. However, they are available by request from the author.
6) The full model reported here also included a variable for year in
order to allow for the interpretation of the interaction effect for par-
tisan year.
7) These analyses are available graphically by contacting the author.
8) A similar analysis was done comparing the about right option to the
too much option, and suggests that Independents and Republicans
are nearly indistinguishable from one another, while Democrats are
much more favorable of the status quo with respect to assistance to
blacks.
